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Introduction
John Garvey
Editors’ Note: The following five papers are part of a set of panels presented
at the 2009 AALS meeting exploring the role of institutional pluralism in the
context of legal education. As then-AALS President John Garvey noted in
his presidential address, there are forty-eight religiously-affiliated law schools
whose missions are defined or influenced by particular faiths. The papers
below explore the value and limits of religion in legal education. The Journal
of Legal Education may publish additional papers from this symposium in future
issues.
During my term as President of the Association of American Law Schools,
I proposed that we focus our attention on the idea of institutional pluralism.
This idea occurred to me in the first instance because of my attachment to
Catholic higher education. My wife and I have sent our children to Catholic
colleges because we want them to be able to integrate their faith with their
understanding of art, literature, philosophy, politics, and science. I think there
is a place for this kind of comprehensive wisdom in legal education too. Let
me offer a few examples.
Catholics believe in the sanctity of human life. This is connected to some
theological ideas about creation and the incarnation. This belief has obvious
implications for how we think about criminal punishment. It is difficult,
for example, to accept the idea of general deterrence as a justification for
punishment. It is also hard to accept the idea of capital punishment. Modesty
compels me to admit that Catholics have been slower to come to this conclusion
than some other Christian (and non-Christian) churches. But that doesn’t
undercut my point that there is a connection between law and theology.
Catholics believe we should have a special concern for the poor. The
Beatitudes (Matthew 5:1-6) and the parable of the Last Judgment (Matthew
25:35-40) teach that the poor are especially blessed, and that God will judge
us according to how we care for them. The U.S. Catholic Bishops’ pastoral
letter Economic Justice for All (1986)1 argues that these ideas have a bearing on how
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we think about unemployment, welfare policy, agricultural programs, and our
attitude toward developing nations.
I could offer further examples, but you get the idea: a law school where these
kinds of ideas are in wide circulation is going to have a different intellectual
climate than the University of Kentucky.
This is, you might say, a fairly parochial point of view. So it is, though as
my predecessor Bob Drinan, SJ, was fond of saying, there are fourteen Jesuit
law schools in America, and they educate ten percent of the profession. And
there are twenty-five Catholic law schools in all. And if you look at the mission
statements of other religiously affiliated law schools—Baylor, Brigham Young
University, Cardozo, Pepperdine—you will find echoes of what I have said in
all forty-eight of the AALS’s member and fee-paid schools.2
The class of religiously affiliated law schools is a subset of an even larger
idea. Consider another class of schools—those at historically black colleges
and universities like Howard University, North Carolina Central University,
and Texas Southern University. In 1935, Charles Hamilton Houston wrote an
article about the special mission of Howard Law School.3 He pointed out how
few black lawyers there were in states like Alabama (4), Mississippi (6), and
Louisiana (8). There were a lot of white lawyers in those states but, he said,
[E]xperience has proved that the average white lawyer, especially in the South,
cannot be relied upon to wage an uncompromising fight for equal rights for
Negroes. He has too many conflicting interests, and usually himself profits
as an individual by that very exploitation…which, as a lawyer, he would be
called upon to attack and destroy.4

Houston conceived for Howard a special mission to serve this underserved
population. This would mean a different academic emphasis. The law of
business associations might focus on small business rather than multinational
corporations; the law of carriers on the passenger or shipper rather than the
management. Life and fire insurance would draw more attention than marine
insurance. The historically black colleges and universities are like religiously
affiliated schools in several respects: (1) they have a distinctive mission and
point of view that influences the intellectual culture; (2) that mission may
influence the subject matter of the curriculum; and (3) they hold a special
appeal for some groups of faculty and (4) students. There is, in the universe of
law schools, a kind of institutional pluralism. Boston College and Howard are
different from other schools, in different ways.
But they are not alone in being different. Consider a third class of schools—
ones with a unique point of view, like George Mason. Henry Manne, the
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Out of a total of 195.
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4.

Id. at 49.

Introduction

127

godfather of that law school, wrote about his vision for it in 1993.5 The
original plan called for students to “major” in one of several academic fields—
economics, political science, technology, or behavioral science. That was too
expensive, so George Mason decided to concentrate on economics. A lot of
fields in law made use of economics. There were enough academics trained in
Law and Economics to build a faculty. Students would be introduced to the
culture through a six-hour course in Quantitative Methods. And nearly every
course would have a Law and Economics flavor.
The antonym of George Mason might be a school like Antioch (which
eventually merged into the University of the District of Columbia).6 Antioch
was started by Edgar and Jean Cahn in 1972 to train public interest lawyers
through a comprehensive clinical method. During their first two weeks in
school students would live with families in poor areas of Washington. Before
the first year was out students and their teachers would work at providing free
legal services to these clients.
Then there are schools that have a special subject matter focus rather than
a point of view—environmental law (Vermont Law School, Lewis & Clark Law
School), intellectual property (The Franklin Pierce Law Center).
Finally (maybe I should have started here) there are the state law schools—
more than 50. State schools often have a well defined mission to a particular
population. The University of Kentucky used to negotiate with the legislature
about how many out-of-state students it could take. They are a distinct
minority, and of course they pay more tuition. Kentucky has a well developed
specialty in Equine Law. Its environmental program and one of its journals
pay special attention to coal mining. The Law School and some of its faculty
also perform research functions for the Kentucky General Assembly.
The Advantages of Institutional Pluralism
The examples of institutional pluralism are so familiar and so numerous
that we might miss the point about how counter-cultural it is to celebrate the
idea. In our everyday thinking about law schools we tend to measure them by
the same yardstick. The ABA has its standards. The AALS has its four core
values. The U.S. News & World Report lines schools up on one axis and ranks
them from 1-200.
On the whole I think that cultivating differences is a better thing for
legal education. It may be good for consumers of legal education in the way
varieties of mustard are good for consumers of picnic food. Prospective law
students have different tastes. Charles Hamilton Houston’s ideal of a school
that taught its graduates to undertake a career of service and fight for equality
might appeal to a young African American from Alabama. BYU’s offer of an
5.
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opportunity to integrate the study of law with service and spiritual growth
might appeal to a young Mormon just back from a mission in Argentina. A
young woman who wants some day to be governor of Kentucky would have
reason to prefer UK over Duke.
Institutional pluralism might also be good for the progress of legal
thought. We are not as comfortable talking about truth as John Stuart Mill
was when he wrote On Liberty. But most of us acknowledge the idea of forward
progress in intellectual life. Einstein’s theory of general relativity explains
better how gravity works than Newton’s system does. Let me mention five
ways institutional pluralism might contribute to this effort.
One obvious advantage of having a group of people using the same tools
or thinking about the same problem is that more people know more. On
weekends my wife and I do the crossword puzzles together, and we go more
than twice as fast as either of us can working alone. She knows a lot of words I
don’t. This is hardly surprising. We read entirely different kinds of books and
magazines and have for years. Let us call this advantage more data.
A second advantage of having several people interested in the same problem
might be parallel processing. Think of my wife and me doing the daily Jumbles
rather than the crossword puzzle. These are five anagrams that answer a riddle.
The first clue might be ENAKO, which you can unscramble to spell OAKEN.
The second might be DROVEN (VENDOR), and so on. Here we go faster
not because we have more data but because we can run through two sets of
permutations at once.
A third advantage to collective intellectual effort is the one we usually have
in mind when we talk about mentoring. I read Walter Isaacson’s biography
of Einstein7 this summer. You often hear it said that Einstein was a better
physicist than a mathematician. The point is exaggerated, but there is some
truth in it. When Einstein moved from Prague to Zurich in 1912 he asked his
friend Marcel Grossmann for help with non-Euclidean geometry. It was the
introduction to Riemann’s metric tensors that allowed Einstein to capture
the general theory of relativity—the idea that gravity could be defined as the
curvature of space-time.
A fourth feature of institutional pluralism—I’m not sure whether to call it
an advantage or an aspect—is what we might call the institutional aesthetic,
or style, or culture. Consider the Venetian school of painting in the 15th and
16th century—Bellini, Giorgione, Titian, Tintoretto, Veronese, Lotto. There
were things these painters shared and collectively developed. One was an
interest in light and color that anticipates the impressionists by four hundred
years. (Think about Venus and the Lute Player at the Metropolitan Museum.) A
second was a distinctive style of brushwork that gave their paintings a smooth
appearance. A third was the use of oils, a development born of necessity; the
Venetians needed a medium that would stand up to the damp air of a city
laced with canals.
7.
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Finally there is what I might call the coffeehouse effect–the communication
of similar ideas across different fields. I’m not sure I can describe how this
works. Carl Schorske’s interesting book Fin-de-Siècle Vienna8 explains how
revolutionary changes communicated themselves across different fields in the
coffeehouses of turn-of-the-century Vienna: how the Expressionist painter
Oskar Kokoschka and the atonal musician Arnold Schoenberg shared the
idea that everything is in flux; and how Freud in psychology and Gustav Klimt
in art both began to explore the world of instinct, self, and the interior life.
Some Questions
I have sketched a picture of institutional pluralism in legal education, and
suggested some ways in which schools with distinct cultures might both serve
students better and advance the cause of legal theory. I would now like to
mention some doubts I entertain about my own idea.
The first is big: institutional pluralism may be impossible. David Riesman
once gave some lectures at the University of Nebraska9 in which he talked
about his failed effort to build a distinctive law school at the University of
Buffalo. His idea was to “develop a curriculum that was not merely a minor
league version of the Eastern Seaboard schools but rather one which was
designed with reference to the particular problems of Western New York.”
The effort failed because of three homogenizing influences. First, at least half
the faculty, and all but one of the younger people, had gone to law school at
Harvard. They wanted to teach the courses that were held in high esteem at
Harvard. Second, good students tended to have their eyes on the Supreme
Court and the SEC, not the Buffalo City Planning Commission. Third, the
faculty and the administration were interested in building an institution that
would succeed according to the established norms of ranking. I might add a
fourth such influence: large firms find a simple ranking system like that used
by the U.S. News & World Report attractive for the same reason law schools like
LSAT scores: both are ways of reducing information costs and simplifying the
process of choosing among many applicants.
Some of Riesman’s objections have less force today than they did seventy
years ago when he taught at Buffalo. There are more good law schools
competing with Harvard. I don’t just mean Yale, Chicago, and Stanford.
There is a more vibrant intellectual life in the American legal academy today
than there was in Riesman’s time. Young faculty must write before they can
get hired. They have more and different role models, and a more sophisticated
understanding of the U.S. News rankings. It may be that we are better able, at
half a century’s remove, to resist the temptation to all be like Harvard.
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I could say more along this line, but let me turn to a second kind of
objection: even if we could make institutional pluralism work it might be a bad
idea. Maybe what we want is diversity within institutions, not pluralism among
institutions. Maybe the best way to discover truth is “out of a multitude of
tongues”10 rather than through a collective effort. John Stuart Mill says it’s
good to have dissent—not everybody walking in the same direction—because
(1) an unpopular opinion might be true; and even if it is not, (2) we will
understand the truth better if we have to defend it.11
This objection is something of a red herring. Even if institutional pluralism
meant that private schools could limit unorthodox expression,12 we would still
have disagreement between institutions. It’s not clear that Mill’s argument
entails protection for dissent at every level. More importantly, though, the idea
of a distinctive institutional culture is not inconsistent with individual freedom
of inquiry. None of the advantages to collective effort which I described entails
or depends on censorship. My wife and I would do crossword puzzles and
Jumbles less effectively if either of us tried to control what the other thought.
A mentor is a bad teacher if she forbids her student to put her insights to
new uses. The Venetian school of painting taught and nourished a distinctive
style of art through collaborative effort. It did not depend for its success on
the suppression of competing styles. You see the point: collaboration is not
control.
Conclusion
You may detect a note of uncertainty about the suggestion I am making.
Institutional pluralism is a familiar phenomenon (most of us work for such
places), but one we have not embraced in the legal academy. I think it would
be a very healthy thing both for our students and for the intellectual life if we
paid more attention to it. Schools don’t need to compete on the same track to
succeed.
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